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1 Introduction
The global climate change governance
architecture provides a space within which climate
change problems and responses are conceptualised
and negotiated. However, such negotiations are
not based on rational debate over normative
concepts within neutral policymaking arenas.
Instead, political economy analysis shows how
negotiations over climate change policy problems
are driven by power politics between different
actors that serve to promote or sideline different
positions (see Tanner and Allouche, this IDS
Bulletin). Furthermore, the positions that are
negotiated are not necessarily ‘objective’; the
conceptualisation of policy problems and solutions
is also highly politicised and tied to different
values and political ideologies (Clapp and
Dauvergne 2005). This article responds to calls to
understand climate change through a political
economy framework that takes into account the
political and ideological processes embedded in the
global climate change governance architecture
(see Tanner and Allouche, this IDS Bulletin).
The evolving financial frameworks for managing
climate change provide a key site through which
the global political economy of climate change
plays out. There is an increasing proliferation of
climate change funds and mechanisms for
generating and channelling resources, each
bringing to the arena new resources, actors and
institutional ideologies. For example, until
recently, all significant funding for climate change
adaptation fell under the remit of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). However, consensus over the
inadequacy of UNFCCC funds to meet climate
change response needs in vulnerable developing
countries (Chandani and Siegele 2010; Mitchell et
al. 2008) has given rise to the World Bank approved
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). The CIFs are a
collaborative effort among the multilateral
development banks (MDBs) intended to ‘bridge
the financing gap’ for supporting developing
countries in responding to climate change
(www.climateinvestmentfunds.org). The CIFs are
larger than all of the existing funds under the
UNFCCC process. The CIFs therefore both
reflect and are likely to catalyse significant
changes in the global political dynamics and
incentive structures of climate change response
measures (Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin).
This changing international landscape of climate
finance has an influence on the national-level
political economy context of both climate change
and development decision-making. Unprecedented
environmental investments are generating new
incentives for national policymakers and
implementing agencies; new governance
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mechanisms are being shaped by different
actors, ideas and interests to manage the
disbursal of funds and implementation of action;
and these mechanisms are providing new arenas
to re-negotiate and re-conceptualise both global
and national development and climate change
approaches. Yet to date, there is relatively little
research into how these changes to global level
political and financial dynamics might play out
at the national level. What do these changes in
the international political economy of climate
change mean for the dynamics of climate change
policy processes at the national level? How will
the new ideas and ideologies around climate
change adaptation be received and interpreted in
national policymaking arenas? What does this
mean for how power, processes and resources are
negotiated and institutionalised?
This article addresses this research gap through
a detailed case study analysis of one of the CIFs,
the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
(PPCR), in Nepal. We begin by reviewing the
objectives of the PPCR, including the
assumptions and ideologies underpinning these
objectives. Second, we assess how these
objectives are being interpreted and re-
conceptualised by different actors at the national
scale in Nepal; and how this conceptualisation is
influenced by, and reinforces or challenges,
existing political ideologies and interests. Third,
we consider the institutional implications of
these different conceptualisations, including
conflicting approaches to power and resource
allocation in the design and implementation of
the PPCR. Finally, we suggest that greater
attention to these political economy dynamics of
the PPCR process could help resolve some of the
tensions emerging between different actors and
divergent interests in the PPCR process as it
moves forwards towards implementation.
The findings presented in this article are based
on case study data on the PPCR process in Nepal
collected and analysed between July and
December 2010. Methods of data collection
included an initial stakeholder and institutional
analysis conducted at the outset of the study and
updated throughout the study period; key
informant interviews (semi-structured and open-
ended) with stakeholders identified through the
stakeholder mapping exercise, including from
government, donor agencies, MDBs and civil
society; and document analysis of formal and
informal PPCR and climate change planning
documentation generated throughout the PPCR
process from its inception in May 2009 through
to the outputs of the most recent mission in
November 2010.
2 The PPCR: objectives and assumptions
The PPCR is seen as the CIF ‘adaptation fund’ –
indeed it was initially entitled the ‘Adaptation
Pilot Fund’ but the World Bank changed this title
in response to criticisms that it would compete
with the Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC
(Müller 2008). The PPCR has the overall
objective to ‘pilot and demonstrate ways to
integrate climate risk and resilience into core
development planning, while complementing
other ongoing activities’ (CIF 2008: 2). The
PPCR aims to achieve this by,
… providing incentives for scaled-up action
and transformational change in integrating
consideration of climate resilience in national
development planning consistent with poverty
reduction and sustainable development goals.
(CIF 2008: 2)
In reframing itself as a fund for building ‘climate
resilience’ rather than ‘adaptation’, and by
placing emphasis on integrating resilience into
national development planning, the development
of the PPCR marked a shift in thinking for
adaptation support under the global climate
change governance architecture. Conventional
support for adaptation under the UNFCCC has
been criticised for taking a narrow interpretation
of adaptation as a response to specific climate
change impacts (Burton et al. 2002; Schipper
2006). This approach has been branded an
‘impacts-first’ approach to defining climate risks
(Burton et al. 2002), which has resulted in what
Klein defines as ‘technology-based’ adaptation
interventions such as dams, early-warning
systems, seeds and irrigation schemes based on
specific knowledge of future climate conditions
(Klein 2008). This is in line with what Bernstein
(2002: 4) describes as a ‘liberal environmental’
ideology around environmental governance,1
which promotes a technical understanding of
environmental and sustainability problems, and
promotes solutions that are compatible with
economic growth.
However, this technocratic and isolated approach
to supporting adaptation has been heavily
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criticised for failing to address the contextual
factors related to development that determine
vulnerability to climate change impacts; that
enable or disable resilience to climate change
impacts (Schipper 2007). Instead, such critics
have advocated for a more integrated approach
to supporting adaptation in developing countries,
that sees adaptation ‘mainstreamed’ into
development planning (Reid et al. 2003; Klein
2008).
Similarly, the goal of ‘transformational change’ is
an innovative step towards reframing what is
meant by adaptation to climate change, beyond
‘building resilience’. ‘Resilience’ requires
building adaptive capacity – the more resilient a
unit, the greater its capacity to adapt, and so the
less vulnerable it is to climate and other hazards.
But resilience is also only a first step towards
adaptation in a situation where vulnerability is
determined by a development deficit situation.
This is because ‘resilience’ implies returning a
system to its original state following disturbance
(Dodman et al. 2009). This interpretation of
resilience stems from its use in both engineering
and ecology, and is echoed by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) as applied to climate change: ‘The ability
of a social or ecological system to absorb
disturbances while retaining the same basic structure
and ways of functioning’ (IPCC 2007: 880; own
emphasis).
‘Transformation’ on the other hand, although
never explicitly defined by the PPCR
documentation, suggests changes to the
structural constraints that impede adaptation,
challenging the systems that drive vulnerability
(Pelling 2010). This could be taken as
incompatible with ‘resilience’, which does not
require changes to guiding assumptions or
established frameworks. However, Pelling (2010)
suggests that resilience and transformational
change are in fact co-dependent: higher-order
transformational change can create the
conditions for systems to be resilient, and a lack
of resilience at lower orders stifles the conditions
necessary for transformational change.
By striving for both ‘resilience’ and also
‘transformational change’, the PPCR seemingly
takes significant steps towards moving beyond a
narrowly focused approach to adaptation, towards
understanding and focusing on the interactions
between climate change vulnerability and
development. Such indications have led observers
such as Ayers and Huq (2009) to optimistically
suggest that the arrival of the PPCR signified a
real opportunity for development assistance to
address underlying factors of vulnerability that
are overlooked by a Convention-based approach.
The authors state:
[The establishment of the PPCR] does point to
progress in understanding… ‘climate-resilient
development’ – rather than specific and
additional climate-change adaptation… new
development funds relevant to climate-change
adaptation should be used to fund what the
UNFCCC cannot; namely, broader resilience
building, necessary for ‘additional’ adaptation
to be successful. (Ayers and Huq 2009: 682)
However, the selection process of pilot countries
to the PPCR suggest that a technocratic and
‘impacts-based’ ideology remains pervasive in the
institutions managing PPCR. For instance, the
selection process for pilot countries involved first
screening developing countries in line with their
exposure to climate change impacts (based on
predefined climate change impacts selected by
an external expert committee); and then those
regions or countries selected as ‘climate change
hotspots’ being screened for ‘vulnerability’ based
on a range of poverty and development-related
indicators. Nepal, for example, was selected as a
PPCR pilot country, based on its status as a
‘vulnerable mountain environment… [with]
potentially serious implications associated with
rapid glacial melt’, as well as having low
‘adaptive capacity’ based on a low score on
Human Development Indicators (CIF 2009: 20).
This approach gives primacy to climate change
impacts over development indicators in defining
vulnerability, and also assesses the two
separately, rather than assessing the interactions
between them in each country. This illustrates
the political nature of defining vulnerability even
where scientific criteria are used (see Klein and
Möhner, this IDS Bulletin). The political
alterations to the selection process after this
assessment further underline this assertion (see
Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin).
The remainder of this article will consider the
extent to which the PPCR in Nepal has indeed
refocused adaptation support towards integrated,
development-based resilience building and
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‘transformational change’; or how far a
technocratic and top-down ideology of how to ‘do’
adaptation has filtered down to the country level
and influenced the way in which resilience and
adaptation is being interpreted under the PPCR
in Nepal.
3 PPCR planning process in Nepal: negotiating
resilience and transformational change at the
national level
Nepal’s engagement with the PPCR began with
the acceptance of the offer for participation in
the PPCR by the Ministry of Environment
(MOE), the national focal point for the PPCR,
on behalf of the Government of Nepal on 13 May
2009. The preparation of the PPCR in Nepal is
being facilitated by the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). To date, the
MDBs have fielded two Joint Missions to Nepal
(in September 2009 and November 2010), and a
small team of national and international
consultants has been seconded to the MOE to
work with the government on the development of
the first phase of PPCR preparation, the
development of a Strategic Program for Climate
Resilience (SPCR). Through a process of field-
level vulnerability assessments, detailed
consultations and a review of climate and
development policy documents, the SPCR
consulting team, MDBs and MOE have designed
and agreed upon four draft components of the
SPCR (ADB et al. 2010):
1 Building Climate Resilient Watershed and
Water Resources in Mountain Eco-regions;
2 Building Resilience to Climate-related
Extreme Events;
3 Mainstreaming Climate Change Risk
Management in Development;
4 Building Climate Resilient Communities
through Private Sector Participation.
The PPCR process in Nepal has opened up many
new (and some old) issues for negotiation, and
created new sites for these issues to be contested.
This section reviews some of the key issues that
were contested during the PPCR process, and
considers how some of these points of tension can
be traced back to conflicting interpretations of the
universal remit of the PPCR at the national level
between different actors with different interests.
3.1 Achieving ‘climate resilience’
Resilience has been defined in different ways by
different stakeholder groups (see Table 1).
Specifically, the MDBs interpreted ‘climate
resilience’ as distinct from adaptation; while the
MOE did not make this distinction. These
conflicting definitions resulted in some confusion
over the relationship between the PPCR and
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Table 1 Different perceptions of climate resilience and adaptation
Stakeholder group Interpretation of climate resilience Adaptation
MOE ? Synonymous with adaptation ? Long term and strategic
? Long term and strategic ? Programmatic and integrated
? Programmatic and integrated ? Addresses underlying vulnerability to climate 
? Addresses underlying vulnerability to variability and climate change
climate variability and climate change
MDB/Consultants ? Long term and strategic ? Urgent and immediate
? Mainstreamed ? Short term
? ‘Climate proofing’ ? Projectised
? ‘Climate risk management ? Response to current climatic variability
? Response to future climate change ? Does not adequately address longer-term 
? ‘An additional need in light of new climate resilience
climate risks
Donor The same as adaptation, i.e.: ? Long term and strategic
? Long term and strategic ? Programmatic and integrated
? Programmatic and integrated ? Addresses underlying vulnerability to climate 
? Addresses underlying vulnerability to variability and climate change
climate variability and climate change
Source Interview data.
another climate change planning process that was
running simultaneously in Nepal: The
development of the National Adaptation
Programme of Action (NAPA). All stakeholders
generally agreed that NAPA was ‘adaptation
planning’ and the PPCR was ‘climate resilience’,
but the extent to which the two should be focused
on different objectives has been a source of tension
during PPCR development. The PPCR guidelines
suggest that the PPCR should ‘build on NAPAs’.
From the perspective of the MOE, this means that
the adaptation planning undertaken during NAPA
could and should be eligible for funding under the
PPCR, because NAPA priorities should also ‘build
resilience’ (interview with MOE, September 2010).
However, from the perspective of the MDBs,
‘NAPAs are for adaptation planning, the PPCR is to
build climate resilience’ (interview with MDB
consultants, September 2010) and ‘adaptation’
and ‘resilience’ are not the same thing. From the
perspectives of the MDBs and PPCR consulting
team, ‘adaptation’ as defined under the NAPA
refers to ‘urgent and immediate adaptation
needs’, and ‘projectised approaches’, where as
‘climate resilience’ is ‘long term and strategic’,
‘mainstreamed’ and ‘programmatic’ (interviews
with MDBs and consultants, September 2010).
‘Mainstreamed’ is taken by this group of
stakeholders to refer to ‘climate proofing’, and
applied to ensuring infrastructure and in some
cases, policy was robust under future climate
change scenarios. From this perspective, the
focus of ‘climate proofing’ is adding to existing
measures to make them more resilient to a future
climate change – rather than, for example, making
existing measures more robust to a range of
development and climate risks. 
This interpretation of climate resilience echoes a
globalised technocratic discourse on adaptation,
described above, that takes climate impacts as the
starting point for adaptation planning, rather than
the underlying factors that drive or undermine
resilience. This has resulted in a strong emphasis
under the PPCR of climate change trend analysis
and climate information in the analysis of
‘adaptive capacity’. The focus is on the capacity of
communities, sectors or agencies to be more
resilient to future climate changes, but not more
resilient in general. This is well exemplified by the
way in which ‘progress’ against ‘adaptive capacity’
will be monitored and evaluated under the SPCR.
The SPCR project document states that:
In order to establish a benchmark against
which SPCR interventions will be measured,
an adaptive capacity assessment will also be
done within identified resilient communities
for the following events – flood, drought, heat,
extreme event, climate variability.
(SPCR Team 2010)
This assumes that ‘resiliency’ can be controlled,
and is a factor of the capacity to respond to these
five climate-change related impacts. This
approach does not allow for the myriad of factors
that could constrain or enable resiliency or a
broader definition of adaptive capacity. ‘Adaptive
capacity’ under the PPCR refers largely to
‘climate risk management capacity’ (SPCR Team
2010).
The MOE and to some extent donors however,
interpreted adaptation under Nepal’s NAPA as
also long term and strategic, rather than
projectised. This is explicit in the way in which
co-financing was mobilised in order to ensure a
more ‘programmatic and long term approach’ to
NAPA preparation (MOE 2010). From this
perspective, using a distinction between
‘adaptation’ and ‘resilience’ as a reason why the
PPCR cannot be used to finance NAPA caused a
lot of confusion for the government and donor
stakeholders; as remarked by one donor, ‘it’s
splitting hairs. What’s the point of adaptation if it is not
also long term and strategic?’ The government also
felt that the MDB definition of adaptation under
the NAPA undermined the significant effort that
had gone into moving away from projectised
perceptions of adaptation. As noted by one
member of MOE:
We have learned a lot from other countries’ NAPAs.
We are really learning and using this learning in the
Nepal NAPA, to make adaptation part of a longer-
term strategy; this should be recognised.
The tension over the relationship between the
NAPA and the PPCR  has been somewhat
managed by the way in which the SPCR
development has explicitly built on NAPA in its
development. For example, through engagement
of NAPA Thematic Working Group members in
the PPCR preparation process; the repeated
referencing of the NAPA throughout the PPCR
inception documents, and the use of NAPA-
generated information as ‘background’ to the
SPCR processes.
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However, these different perceptions around what
constitutes resilience are reflective of higher order
assumptions and vested interests that are
embedded in the approaches taken by different
stakeholders. For example, the Government of
Nepal was one of the last countries to develop its
NAPA and so had seen the challenges faced by
other countries in securing NAPA funding. By
interpreting ‘climate resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ as
the same, this would justify PPCR funding NAPA-
related activities thereby overcoming the funding
challenge. Further, this would demonstrate to the
international community (to which the MOE is
accountable at the meetings of the UNFCCC) that
Nepal has used the delays in the NAPA process
constructively, learning from criticisms of other
NAPAs that had taken a projectised approach to
adaptation planning, and also by proactively
seeking new avenues for funding its NAPA.
The donors – specifically the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) – also have
particular interests in taking ‘adaptation’ and
‘resilience’ as the same. DFID had put
significant co-financing into the development of
the NAPA and are also major donors to the
PPCR. This means it is in DFID’s interests to see
the two processes aligned to maximise the
effectiveness of investments in both; but also
because the co-finance for the NAPA was
intended to try and ensure the NAPA in Nepal
took a more strategic approach, and this
investment is more justified if the NAPA is
interpreted as also building resilience beyond
projectised adaptation.
The MDBs on the other hand are responding to
the international PPCR agenda as set by the
World Bank. The guidelines for the PPCR suggest
that PPCRs should build on NAPAs, but in all
other PPCR countries the NAPAs had already
been completed, so this process was more
straightforward – PPCRs should move beyond
what had already been done. In Nepal, because
the two processes were going on at the same time,
these guidelines needed to be reinterpreted. Yet,
the agenda driven from above, and the ‘mission
style’ approach to NAPA development, did not
leave much scope for the MDBs to get a more
comprehensive understanding of the specific
circumstances of the NAPA in Nepal.
3.2 Transformative change
Like ‘resilience’, the ‘transformational change’
remit of the PPCR has not been consistently
defined by different stakeholders in the PPCR
process in Nepal, and has been used to justify a
number of different and not necessarily
consistent approaches (see Table 2).
As with ‘resilience’, the different interpretations of
‘transformational change’ all reflect different
interests and values of the stakeholders that hold
them. From the perspective of the MOE,
transformational change means the capacity to
adapt at all scales, from national and sectoral
governance systems right down to the local level.
The government has put a great deal of emphasis
on enabling adaptive capacity at the local level, for
example the government requires all significant
climate investments to demonstrate that 80 per
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Table 2 Different interpretations of transformational change
Stakeholder group Transformational change
MOE Beyond consultants and technical assistance – full capacity within government to manage 
climate change
Adaptive capacity enhanced at the local level
Adaptive capacity no longer constrained by poverty
MDB/Consultants Moving beyond ‘business as usual’
Systems, processes and procedures are climate proofed
Over and above development – influence the way development decisions are made in light of
climate change risks
Donor Transformation of national systems for longer-term ‘adaptive management’
Focus on governance
Moving away from a dependence on donor technical assistance towards governments being 
able to do this themselves
Source Interview data.
cent of funds for climate finance go on project
implementation and not on higher level technical
assistance (the government has insisted that this is
the case under the NAPA implementation;
DFID/EU adaptation investments; and the PCPR).
The MOE argue that transformation is not all
about building technical capacity at the national
level, and that consulting services are not
transformational. As noted by one MOE official:
Stop trying to build my capacity!…We need to
deliver…When the vulnerable people can adapt, that
is when transformation has happened.
(Interview with MOE, October 2010)
Such an approach is consistent with the
accountability incentives for the MOE, to both
the government and the people of Nepal (and
frequently held to account by a vibrant civil
society and media). Focusing on using adaptation
finance for delivery and not just capacity
building generates visible outcomes from climate
change investments to help the government
justify how the money is being used.
From the MDB perspective, ‘transformational
change’ means providing access to knowledge
and resources to be able to ‘climate proof ’
development investments. Climate change is
bringing about new risks, so ‘business as usual’
development planning is no longer enough and
planning systems need to be ‘transformed’ in
order to be able to take account of these risks.
The Aide Memoire from the most recent PPCR
mission operationalises this perception in
relation to SPCR planning in Nepal, as follows:
The traditional ‘business as usual’ approach to
development planning in Nepal is not
designed to cope with current climate risks.
National efforts to build climate resiliency
suffers from a lack of high quality
standardised data to inform early warning
systems and insufficient technical capabilities
to apply appropriate climate change risk
management tools. (ADB et al. 2010)
Thus, transformational change from this
perspective is dependent on data and technical
capacity in government planning systems.
The donor perspective here represents the DFID
country office. As noted, DFID is one of the main
donors to the PPCR in Nepal, and also to the two
other major climate change investment
programmes – the NAPA and a DFID/EU work
programme. As such, DFID has a vested interest
in seeing the PPCR well coordinated, with the
other climate change investment programmes;
but this also perhaps encourages a ‘bigger
picture’ perspective beyond the remit of the
PPCR towards how to enable effective climate
change resilience more generally, and creating
an agenda behind which all investments can
align, and a framework that would support all
investments. A strong governance framework
that enables access to financial, social, political
and information resources that people need to
adapt with, is an obvious fit.
For the MDBs on the other hand, their primary
remit is to demonstrate results and draw lessons
against building climate resilience. As stated in
the recent Aide Memoire:
A key goal of Nepal’s SPCR is to provide
lessons through learning-by-doing over the
next few years that demonstrate modalities
for building climate resilience in water
resource management and community
development planning which can be replicated
in other river systems and vulnerable
communities (ADB et al. 2010)
Integrating climate change information into
existing development strategies as a key aspect
of transformational change is relatively
straightforward approach that can be assessed
and learned from; transforming what is meant by
‘business as usual’ in the first place, is not.
4 The power implications of different approaches
Different conceptualisations of what constitutes
climate change resilience and transformational
change are closely linked with similarly divergent
concepts of what ‘national ownership’ and a
‘country-driven approach’ look like. From the
government’s perspective, if the PPCR is
‘country driven’, then they should be able to
define how ‘climate resilience’ is interpreted,
especially in light of the fact that there is not yet
any precedent for PPCR. One of the reasons why
the government is so insistent that the NAPA be
the basis for PPCR planning and that the PPCR
could be used to fund NAPA, is because the
NAPA process in Nepal is widely considered to
have had a high level of government ownership,
has been endorsed by Cabinet and the Prime
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Minster’s office, and has been presented by the
government as the key national document to:
… provide a basis for the government to guide
further climate change governance and
manage [climate change] financial resources
in a coherent and coordinated manner.
(MOE 2010)
The fact that the government’s preference for
using PPCR money to fund the NAPA was not
accepted (this is because of a different remit of
the PPCR compared to NAPA) has resulted in
the sense that government ownership is
undermined in two ways; first, because the
preference of the government is not accepted;
and second, because this preference was to build
on a ‘government led’ process.
However, the MDBs face a challenge in enabling
the same extent of government ownership over
the PPCR as had been afforded in the NAPA.
First, because the PPCR does not fall under the
UNFCCC; under the UNFCCC it is countries who
report to the Conference of the Parties (COP)
and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group
on their NAPA progress – although implementing
agencies are also accountable to demonstrate
how they have supported NAPA development.
Under the PPCR however, it is the MDBs rather
than the countries for whom ultimate
accountability rests to demonstrate lessons for
climate resilience from the pilots. The MDBs are
working on a process for which there is not yet
any precedent, they are directly engaging with
new administrative structures and ministries
that do not have senior coordination experience.
At the same time, they need to demonstrate
good results, in a timely way. The incentives for
strong government ownership are not aligned
with those for low fiduciary risk and fast results.
In Nepal, this tension was managed through the
use of a consulting team, hired in conjunction
with the government, whose remit was drafted in
close coordination with the MOE. The consulting
team is based in the ministry and was given
primary responsibility for the drafting of the
SPCR, shifting the power away from the MDBs
and towards this SPCR team. As noted by one
MDB member:
Other SPCR processes have tended towards standard
Bank practices where Banks draft the documents and
then go through an iterative process of agreement with
governments and consultants. In Nepal the consultants
are based in the government, working directly with the
government on drafting the documentation… so the
process is based on nationally identified priorities that
we support. (Interview with MDB representative,
November 2010)
This represents a compromise by the MDBs
towards greater government ownership of the
process. However, from the MOE’s perspective,
this does not constitute full government
ownership. The MOE suggested that it had
autonomy particularly over the PPCR funds; and
suggested that the consultants were accountable
to the MDBs and not to the government. Further,
the MOE was not able to direct the PPCR
towards funding NAPA – while the remit of the
two programmes is different, one government
stakeholder suggested, ‘If there is no precedent, why
can’t we make one?’ (Interview with MOE, August
2010).
Therefore the interpretations of ‘resilience’,
‘adaptation’ and ‘transformational change’ at the
national level and the assumptions and
incentives that drive these interpretations have
real consequences on the ground for how power
is negotiated.
5 Conclusions
This article has explored how the objectives of
the PPCR of ‘climate resilience’ and
‘transformative change’ are being interpreted in
Nepal. Neither concepts are consistently defined
and are therefore open to interpretation to some
degree. This article has shown that the way in
which they are taken up by different stakeholders
in Nepal reflects both vested interests and also
underlying assumptions of the different
stakeholder groups. This article has also shown
that operationalising these re-negotiated
objectives carries implications for both power and
resource allocation between different stakeholder
groups; specifically, who ‘owns’ the process, and
what ‘ownership’ actually entails.
One of the key trade-offs identified by this article
is that between an emphasis on demonstrating
results through the PPCR, versus creating an
enabling environment for meaningful
‘transformational change’. For the MDBs, the
incentives are effectively to demonstrate results
of the PPCR specifically – to ‘provide lessons
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through learning-by-doing over the next few
years that demonstrate modalities for building
climate resilience’ (ADB et al. 2010.) The need to
demonstrate results ‘in a few years’ is at odds
with an interpretation of ‘transformational
change’ that would see longer-term support to
stronger governance systems to support ‘adaptive
management’. The latter involves taking risks,
handing over greater responsibility to national
governments that may or may not have the
capacity to take the agenda forward quickly and
effectively.
Thus, incentives are generated to ‘climate proof ’
existing investments, rather than finding new
ways to develop climate resilience. This echoes
the conventional framing of adaptation at the
global level, that emphasises technocratic
solutions and externally driven expert
judgement in defining and managing risks; the
same ideology that a ‘resilience-based’ and
‘transformative’ approach contests. This article
therefore suggests that greater attention is
needed to understanding the political economy
of how these seemingly progressive concepts are
negotiated at the national scale, in order to
resolve some of the conflicts that arise during
this process, and to promote effective and
transformative climate resilience on the 
ground.
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Note
* Research for this article was carried out
through the Political Economy of Low Carbon
Climate Resilient Development project,
coordinated by IDS and funded by the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID). The views expressed here are the views
of the authors and do not represent the views or
policies of IDS, DFID, or the UK government.
1 The premise of liberal environmentalism is
that liberalisation of trade and finance is
consistent with, and even necessary for,
international environmental protection; and
that environmental management can be
managed through market-based mechanisms
(Bernstein 2002: 4).
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